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ABSTRACT
We introduce a Semantic Identification Attack, in which
an adversary uses semantic signals about the pages visited
in one browsing session to identify other browsing sessions
launched by the same user. This attack allows an adver-
sary to determine if two browsing sessions originate from
the same user regardless of any measures taken by the user
to disguise their browser or network. We use the MSNBC
Anonymous Browsing data set, which contains a large set
of user visits (labeled by category) to implement such an
attack and show that even very coarse semantic information
is enough to identify users. We discuss potential counter-
measures users can take to defend against this attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online privacy is becoming an increasingly important issue
for users, policy makers, and academic researchers. In re-
cent years there has been significant work highlighting the
fragility of user privacy by exposing threats ranging from the
de-anonymization of public data sets to third party tracking
in online browsing.
In particular, an area of focus has been the ability for ad-
vertisers to identify users across browsing sessions. Many
privacy experts advocate that users should regularly clear
browsing cookies to prevent third party trackers from build-
ing detailed profiles and linking their webpage visits. Other
experts recommend private browsing modes (such as incog-
nito mode on Google Chrome) to prevent the browser from
storing any persistent browsing data and to ensure that web
cookies are never reused. There are even more powerful
tools, such as Tor or Brave, a new open source browser fo-
cused explicitly on blocking advertisements and third party
trackers.
Unfortunately, these measures are not adequate. In this pa-
per, we introduce a semantic identification attack, a new
attack that can identify users across multiple browsing ses-
sions. In this attack, an adversary can, in some cases, lever-
age semantic signals - features derived from the content
viewed by a user (words on pages viewed, page titles, links
in/out of page, etc) - to identify when two browsing sessions
have been launched by the same user. If one of the sessions
contains personally identifying information, the adversary
now has a way of linking this information to other sessions
launched by the user.
A user is unlikely to visit the same urls in every session.
However, the urls in a given user’s browsing sessions are un-
likely to be drawn completely at random from all the urls
on the web. If a user’s web browsing is characterized by a
set of tasks (checking certain news topics, reading specific
blogs, etc), their browsing sessions will consistently contain
visits to pages/websites relevant to these tasks. The distri-
bution of these visits can be viewed as a user specific session
fingerprint. Though a user’s browsing sessions are likely to
deviate and contain other behavior as well, the presence of
these pages fingerprints the user to the session.
The ability to extract a browsing fingerprint and use it to
link together a user’s sessions has significant implications
for online privacy. An adversary that could identify the
browsing fingerprint for a user could determine with high
probability when a certain browsing session belongs to that
user even when they use multiple devices, regularly clear
cookies or obfuscate their identity through proxies.
While there has been prior work in identifying users across
browsing sessions, nearly all methods have relied on the
browser or network metadata for identifying users. Network
signals and browser metadata signatures can be spoofed or
disguised through extensions and proxies. However, seman-
tic data about browsing sessions will still be available to
websites and even to third parties such as advertisers. We
demonstrate that this kind of data can be used to identify
and track users.
In this paper, we first review past work and highlight the
differences between prior approaches and ours. We then ex-
plain the intuition behind the semantic identification attack
and present several different strategies. Finally, we evaluate
the attacks on a collection of user browsing data and discuss
the countermeasures.
2. RELATEDWORK
There has been significant work on fingerprinting users on
the basis of their browser[19][14]. [7] and [20] describe how
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users can be uniquely identified by analyzing system fonts,
screen resolution, information stored in HTTP headers (ie,
HTTP User Agent strings) and coarse IP prefix information
(users can test their fingerprints at [1] or [2]). Additionally,
[15] showed that it is possible to fingerprint users by lever-
aging the subtle differences in the ways different browsers
render the same text. These differences provide consistent,
unique fingerprints that can be used to track users.
However, there has been little work on identifying user web
browsing without using browser metadata or network infor-
mation as features. While both have been used with large
success to fingerprint users, one could argue that more se-
cure browsers or more privacy awareness could diminish the
success they provide adversaries. Our paper shows however,
that even if a user were take these precautions, an adversary
could still identify them on the basis of the content of their
browsing. Browsing history is a strong predictor for learn-
ing user attributes, suggesting that semantic signals from
browsing sessions could convey significant discriminating in-
formation [8]. Jones et al [11] show that it is possible to infer
personal information (gender, age, location, etc) from query
logs and link a particular user to a query stream when pro-
vided with some background information on that user. [12]
demonstrates that even a countermeasure like token-based
hashing of queries fails to prevent an adversary from iden-
tifying users. [9] proposes the ZEALOUS algorithm, which
is capable of achieving strong privacy guarantees on query
logs. [18] focuses on determining when a single individual
is masquerading behind multiple aliases on a web forum us-
ing the content present in forum posts. it is similar to our
work in that it aims to use semantic information to uniquely
identify individuals. However, [18] is applied to a forum (as
opposed to web browsing) and leverages significantly richer
data.
Another closely related field of study is differential privacy[17].
Though differential privacy is primarily concerned with the
privacy guarantees of statistical databases and their individ-
ual entries, some of the core concepts and ideas are appli-
cable in our case. [6] describes some key findings. [5] also
present techniques for preserving privacy in data mining ap-
plications. The 2006 AOL scandal demonstrated that there
are techniques available to identify users from anonymized
web search data [10]. Narayanan and Shmatikov presented
a further class of de-anonymization techniques by using the
IMDB dataset to identify individual users in the Netflix
Prize Dataset [16].
3. BROWSING FINGERPRINTS
We first describe browsing fingerprints and the intuition be-
hind semantic identification attacks.
3.1 Intuition
A semantic identification attack leverages the fact that web
browsing tends to be a highly personal activity. Let Du be
the distribution over all webpages of the likelihood that a
user u visits a webpage. Thus, for a given page p and a user
u, Du(p) is the probability that user u visits web page p.
Du is not a uniform distribution - it is obvious that there
are certain pages pi that a user is more likely to visit and
that Du is skewed towards these pages. Even though a user
is unlikely to repeatedly visit the same web page, they are
like to repeatedly visit similar types of webpages. A user is
more likely to visit pages that pertain to the tasks, interests,
and habits motivating the user’s browsing.
The intuition behind a semantic identification attack is that
many users have a unique Du - the distribution of pages
they’re likely to visit is shared with few others, if any. We
thus refer to Du as the user’s browsing fingerprint - a signa-
ture unique to the user, that can be used to identify them.
For a given session si launched by a user ui, the goal of
a semantic identification attack is to extract the browsing
fingerprint of si (some representation of Di). Given two ses-
sions si and sj , the adversary can then compare the browsing
fingerprints (the extracted representations of Di and Dj).
Because browsing fingerprints are unique to users, an adver-
sary can deduce that si and sj were launched by the same
user if their browsing fingerprints are similar enough.
The likelihood a user visits a page is dependent on the con-
tent of that page. In order to extract a browsing finger-
print and some representation of Du, an adversary must have
some knowledge of the topics, entities or words on each page
visited by the user. We refer to these as ”semantic signals”.
At their core, semantic signals are features which capture
the interests, habits, and preferences of the user. Across
multiple sessions, the pages a user visits are likely to share
some semantic similarity. If we treat each page as a set of
semantic signals, then Du can be thought of a user specific
distribution over these semantic signals. The browsing fin-
gerprint for a user is a representation of this distribution.
The following example illustrates this. Imagine a computer
science student from California studying in Cambridge, MA.
This user’s browsing interests consist of their favorite sports
teams (the Golden State Warriors), local Boston news, and
Stack Overflow. The browsing fingerprint for this user (and
their respective Du) would likely indicate a skew towards
pages covering these topics. This user is characterized by
their interests - the locality of their news, specific sports
personalities, and their professional interests. Individually,
none of these interests are unique and are shared by hun-
dreds of thousands of individuals. When combined however,
the set of users who lie at this intersection is much smaller.
If an adversary saw two browsing sessions which captured
these interests - the Golden State Warriors, Boston news
and Stack Overflow, the adversary might predict that both
sessions originated from the same user as their browsing
fingerprints were similar. If the user’s interests included
something esoteric (like Vietnamese vegetarian cooking), it
becomes significantly easier for the adversary to extract a
browsing fingerprint (assuming Vietnamese vegetarian cook-
ing is a more unique and hence a distinguishing interest than
the other topics).
Let us explore another simple example. Suppose an adver-
sary identifies from a user’s browsing session that they’re
interested in privacy research. This information alone is un-
likely to uniquely identify or distinguish this user as plenty
of individuals are interested in privacy research and spend
time reading about it online. However, suppose that the
adversary was also able to identify that this user was also
interested in Loreena Mckennitt’s music. Loreena Mckennitt
is a famous musician, and likely to have a wide online follow-
ing. Individually, neither of these interests are particularly
unique or distinguishing - a browsing fingerprint encapsulat-
ing either of them would be relatively useless. However, the
intersection of those who both listen to her music and are
interested in privacy research is likely to be rather small. A
browsing fingerprint that captures this intersection is signif-
icantly more powerful and unique. Whenever the adversary
sees a browsing session that involves privacy research and
Loreena McKennitt, the adversary will with strong proba-
bility predict that it was launched by the same user. In this
manner, the adversary may be able to track the user across
multiple sessions.
In this work we focus on determining whether two sessions
originate from the same user (and thus share the same fin-
gerprint). We do this by extracting browsing fingerprints for
each session and comparing those fingerprints to determine
whether they originate from the same user.
For any given user, there are several cases for which a brows-
ing fingerprint will be difficult to extract/leverage.
1. Individuals who do not browse frequently or browse
in a very general manner (visiting only the homepage
of certain websites) are unlikely to have a distinctive
browsing fingerprint. Though we may be able to learn
their fingerprint, it is not unique enough to identify
them in other browsing sessions. Thus, any attack will
succeed at identifying ”outlying” users - users who’s
behavior is sufficiently unique that it can be identified.
2. Though we assume a user’s browsing will largely fol-
low Du, there are likely to be browsing sessions which
constitute atypical behavior and cannot be identified.
Imagine a user who is going on a vacation (not a fre-
quent occurrence) and decides to use the web to plan
their trip. If their browsing session consists exclusively
of trip planning, it is unlikely to correlate with any of
their prior sessions and will thus go unidentified. Simi-
larly, a user who was browsing in response to an emer-
gency (like an earthquake) is unlikely to repeat their
browsing often.
There are several statistical tests for quantifying the differ-
ence between two binned distributions. Most of them - like
the chi-squared test - assume some prior knowledge about
the distribution and the expected values of each bin. Since
an adversary can make no assumptions about the Du , these
tests are not applicable here. We thus introduce our own
methods later in the paper.
3.2 Semantic Signals
Semantic signals capture the content of each page at some
level of granularity. They allow the adversary to extract the
user based browsing fingerprint and build some approxima-
tion of Du. Some examples of semantic signals include:
• The words on the page visited
• Categorical classifications for the page visited (”news”,
”social media”, ”cooking”)
• The title of the page
The success of a semantic identification attack is highly de-
pendent on the granularity of the semantic signals. Rich
signals - such as a listing of every word on every page visit
will allow the adversary to extract a more powerful browsing
fingerprint. Weak signals - such as a simple classification of
each webpage (ie ”news”), is rather poor and will lead to
fewer unique browsing fingerprints.
The semantic signals available to an adversary depend on
the adversary’s capabilities and the position from which they
launch the attack. In this work, we demonstrate that even a
weak adversary with poor signals can still uniquely identify
some users.
3.3 Fingerprint Granularity
Given a browsing session, we can either extract a single fin-
gerprint for the entire session (a cross site fingerprint) or
multiple fingerprints, one for each website in that session.
Most web browsing sessions consist of page visits to multi-
ple different websites. If we extract a cross site fingerprint,
then we extract a single fingerprint that describes the user’s
browsing behavior over all of these websites. If we extract
site fingerprints, then for each website in the session we ex-
tract a single fingerprint describing the user’s behavior on
that website in that session. Because these fingerprints are
being extracted on a per site basis, we extract multiple fin-
gerprints per session (one for each of the websites visited).
As each of these fingerprints reflect more localized behavior
(on a single website), they are less likely to be unique across
users. However, we can use the aggregation of fingerprints
across websites to identify users.
Though individual website based fingerprints are less in-
sightful, they are more resistant to user defenses. A cross
site fingerprint for example, may be hard to collect if the
user blocks third party cookies (preventing cross site data
from being collected by an adversary). However, the web-
site a user visits will always know the pages clicked on by
the user. If this website can extract a granular site specific
fingerprint for the user, they can use that to identify the
user when they revisit the website. Thus, even if a user uses
incognito mode to make these visits, the website may be still
be able to track them.
There are relatively few publicly available browsing data sets
making validation of any of these methods significantly chal-
lenging. Due to constraints with available data for valida-
tion, in this paper we describe our methods in terms of web-
site specific fingerprints. We now discuss several of these
methods.
We assume that an adversary has access to the semantic
signals for a set of S browsing sessions originating from a
set of U different users. We assume that every s ∈ S was
launched by exactly one u ∈ U but that most u launched
multiple sessions in S.
3.4 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions on user browsing:
1. A semantic identification attack assumes that for a
user u, Du is skewed towards certain pages. If Du
was a uniform distribution, and all pages had an equal
likelihood of being visited and browsing sessions would
resemble a random sampling of the web. In such a
case, it would be difficult to extract a unique brows-
ing fingerprint. Because we assume Du is skewed (and
nonuniform), we know there are some pages a user is
more likely to visit and we’re able to extract browsing
fingerprints that are specific to a user.
2. We have some semantic information about the activity
of a user in a browsing session. This could comprise of
the words on every page visited by the user, categorical
labels for each page, or a set of entities capturing the
range of topics spanned by the session. These are the
features leveraged by the adversary in order to identify
users.
3. Conversely, we assume that the adversary has access
to no other information about the browsing session.
These could include geographic location, device iden-
tity, network addresses, or browser metadata signa-
tures. Later in the paper we discuss how access to this
kind of data could improve a semantic identification
attack.
4. ATTACK STRATEGIES
Given two sessions and their associated semantic features,
we wish to determine whether or not they originated from
the same user. In order to do so we must extract some rep-
resentation of the browsing fingerprints and calculate some
similarity score between them. We present two approaches
for making this determination. First however, we briefly
discuss the dataset we use to validate these methods.
4.1 Dataset
The lack of datasets of real browsing sessions severely con-
strains our ability to test different attack strategies. Before
we present our strategies, we briefly describe the dataset
used to validate them.
We used the MSNBC Anonymous Browsing Data set ([3]).
The data contains a list of pages visited on msnbc.com for
990,000 users over a 24 hour period (on September 28, 1999).
Each page is represented as a page category (a page can be
”news”, ”homepage”, ”local”, ”tech”, etc). The granularity
of our data is restricted to the page category, for a given
page that a user visited, we only know what category the
page falls under. We have no way other information about
that particular visit. Below is a sample representation of the
data: {1, 3, 5, 1, 3, 4, 4}{1, 3, 7}
{5, 7, 9, 14, 15}

Each line in the matrix above corresponds to the browsing
activity for a single user. For example, in this case the data
tells us that user corresponding to the second line visited a
page of category type 1, followed by category type 3, and
finally category type 7. This user visited no other pages on
msnbc.com during this time period.
These categories are the ”semantic signals” for each of the
user’s page visits. Despite the coarse grained information(very
different pages could be labelled with the same category), we
show it is still possible to construct unique fingerprints for a
subset of users and to correctly identify sessions originating
from them.
4.1.1 Fingerprint Representation
We represent each session as a vector of the proportions of
each of the 17 categories of pages visited in each session.
Thus if a session contained the visits to the following pages:
[1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 3]
The corresponding vector representation would be
[0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
Since visits to pages of category ”1” represent 10% of the
session’s page visits, pages of category ”2” represent 40%
of the session’s page visits, and etc. Each session can be
seen as a unit vector in a 17 dimensional space, where each
dimension corresponds to a category.
This representation is general and intuitive, but does fail to
capture some potentially interesting information such as the
order in which the user looks at pages in different categories.
4.2 Pairwise Similarity
In this approach, we compute a similarity score for every
single pair of sessions. If the score for two sessions exceeds a
threshold, then we predict that two sessions originate from
the same user. For two sessions represented as the vectors si
and sj , we calculate Score(si, sj) in the following manner.
Score(si, sj) =
Sim(si, sj)∑
k=0
1
Sim(si, sk)
+
∑
k=0
1
Sim(sj , sk)
where Sim is some similarity metric. Intuitively, this score
can be thought of as the combination of a similarity score
(between the two sessions) and a dissimilarity score. We
discuss both in more detail below.
4.2.1 Similarity Score
For calculating the similarity between two sessions si and sj ,
we use the cosine similarity metric, a common measure in
information retrieval. Given two vectors in an n-dimensional
space, cosine similarity measures their distance as a function
of the angle between them.
Cosine(si, sj) =
si · sj
||si||||sj ||
4.2.2 Dissimilarity Score
Simply measuring whether two sessions are similar is not
sufficient enough to capture whether or not they may origi-
nate from the same user. Our underlying goal is to be able
to capture and compare the browsing fingerprints of two ses-
sions. Thus, we need to weight the similarity of two sessions
by how dissimilar those sessions are from all other sessions.
If we have two sessions si and sj such that si is similar to sj
but both si and sj are similar to the bulk of the sessions in
our data set, we are less confidant that si and sj originate
from the same user. it is probable that si and sj (and the
sessions they’re similar too) belong to a mass of users whose
behavior is too shallow or generic to discern. Conversely, if
si and sj were similar to each other but different from other
sessions, we’d be significantly more confidant that both ses-
sions originated from the same user.
4.3 Supervised Learning
Alternatively, as opposed to devising our own similarity score,
we can rely on machine learning to learn some scoring func-
tion. We rely on a multi-layer perceptron classifier from the
scikit-learn python machine learning library[4]. For two ses-
sions si and sj with the category proportion vectors ci and
cj , our classifier takes as input the |ci − cj | (the absolute
value of the difference between the category proportions).
We demonstrate that even with such a simple classifier, we’re
able to achieve success with our model.
4.4 Metrics
We now define the metrics used to evaluate the success of
a semantic identification attack. We consider our attack in
the following framework. Assume we have a set of browsing
sessions S = {s1, s2, .., sn} where each si was launched by a
single user and there is at least one other sj ∈ S such that
sj 6= si and both sj and si were launched by the same user.
For every pair of sessions in S the goal for the adversary is to
identify whether they share the same user. We can measure
an adversary’s success along two dimensions.
4.4.1 Precision
Precision is defined as the proportion of session pairings
identified by the adversary that are correct. Let Sp be the
set of pairs of sessions such that for each pair the adversary
has predicted both sessions originate from the same user.
Let St be the set containing all pairs of sessions in S that
originate from the same user. We can then formally define:
Accuracy =
St ∩ Sp
Sp
4.4.2 Recall
We define recall as the proportion of same origin session
pairs successfully identified by the adversary. More formally:
Recall =
St ∩ Sp
St
4.4.3 Reach
We define reach as the number of unique users for whom
the advertiser has successfully paired at least two sessions.
Reach captures the ”user footprint” of the semantic identifi-
cation attack and allows to quantify the number of users (not
sessions) that an adversary has successfully compromised.
4.4.4 Success
it is important to note that in this framework, there are
many possible definitions for a ”successful” attack. In the
ideal case, an adversary would prefer an attack strategy
which grantees high accuracy and high reach - identifying
sessions from a lot of users with high probability of correct-
ness. However depending on an adversary’s goals, different
dimensions may be prioritized. An advertiser for example,
seeking to broadly identify users in order to show related ad-
vertisements, may care less about accuracy and more about
reach. Since ads are generally viewed as terrible, they may
care more about maximizing the number of users they reach
(as opposed to the proportion of time they’re correct).
Conversely, a different adversary may care more about maxi-
mizing their accuracy (as opposed to their reach). If they’re
trying to closely track a set of users, they may care more
about the strength of their predictions and less about accu-
racy.
5. RESULTS
We now outline the results achieved by applying these tech-
niques to the MSNBC dataset described earlier.
5.1 Data Characteristics
The majority of users visit only a handful of pages before
leaving msnbc.com. Most of these page visits are to ”news”,
”on-air” or ”sports” pages (table 1).
Page Category Frequency Proportion
front page 940469 0.200
news 452387 0.096
tech 207479 0.044
local 386217 0.082
opinion 151409 0.032
on-air 414928 0.088
misc 305615 0.065
weather 439398 0.093
health 196614 0.041
living 131760 0.028
business 96817 0.020
sports 264899 0.056
summary 216125 0.045
bulletin board service 395880 0.084
travel 56576 0.012
msn-news 25249 0.005
msn-sports 16972 0.003
Table 1: Distribution of page views over page cate-
gories
5.2 Session Creation
Unfortunately, because there are no time stamps for page
visits, it is impossible to determine from this data when
a user’s session begins and ends. Even if a user launched
multiple sessions on msnbc.com over the 24 hour window,
all page visits have been aggregated onto a single line. If
clear session demarcations had been provided, then we could
have used them to test our attacks by seeing if our methods
could identify sessions from the same user. Since we do
not have these demarcations however, we have to artificially
create our own sessions. We introduce two methods to split
a single user’s browsing into multiple discrete sessions. We
describe both approaches below.
5.2.1 Homepage Partition
We utilize the intuition that any user starting a new session
on msnbc.com will start by visiting the homepage. Thus for
a given user who visits the list of page [p1, p2, ..pn], we par-
tition this list into sublists whenever a page pj is the home
page. For example, if a user visited 50 pages, and their 20th
page visits and 45th page visits were to the homepage, then
we would partition their browsing into 3 separate sessions
[[p1, ..., p19], [p21, ..., p44], [p46, ..., p50]] . In order to ensure
that sessions are long enough to extract some sort of brows-
ing fingerprint from, we also discard all sessions whose length
is below some minimum threshold k.
5.2.2 Random Partition
In the random partition strategy, we fix the session length
at some k and randomly select k pages at a time from the
user’s browsing list (without replacement) until the pages
left is fewer than k. Each of the k samples corresponds to a
single session from that user. For example, if a user visited
50 pages and k = 20, we would randomly select 20 out of
the 50 pages as the first session, 20 out of the remaining 30
pages as the second session, and discard the remaining 10
pages (since 10 < k). Thus, for this user we would have
artificially created 2 sessions.
While visiting a homepage may signal a user starting a new
session, it could also indicate a context switch within a ses-
sion. A user who was previously browsing the news may
go back to the homepage in order to start browsing sports.
Partitioning on the homepage would split these into two
separate sessions - each with very different characteristics.
As described later in the paper, this is likely the case in our
results. Table 2 and 3 describe the number of sessions gener-
ated (and from how many users) for random and homepage
partitioning respectively.
Session Length (k) Number of Users Number of Sessions
10 35368 102082
15 12777 38731
20 5888 19403
25 3128 11439
30 1891 7609
35 1294 5616
Table 2: Session frequencies and user counts with
different k using random partition
Session Length (k) Number of Users Number of Sessions
10 2645 6164
15 854 2036
20 395 973
25 242 624
30 149 396
Table 3: Session frequencies and user counts with
different k using homepage partition
5.3 Adversary Performance
We now investigate the performance of our attack strate-
gies on this sample data. We tested the attacks on both
homepage partitioned and randomly partitioned sessions.
For homepage partitioning we enforced a minimum session
length of 35 pages (discounting all sessions with fewer than
20 pages from our analysis set). For randomly partitioned
we fixed the session size at 35 pages.
5.3.1 Baseline
We establish a baseline for our algorithms by randomly as-
signing scores between [0, 1] for every pair of sessions. We
then determine the precision/recall scores as we adjust this
cutoff.
5.3.2 Random Partition
We ran the attacks on sessions from random samples of 300,
500, 750 and 1000 users. Taking random samples allows us
to simulate the variance in users an adversary will encounter
when they launch an attack. The browsing fingerprint of
a user is valuable insofar as it is unique and distinguish-
able from the browsing fingerprints of other users. Thus,
an adversary’s ability to identify a specific user is highly
dependent on the other users the adversary sees. Samples
of different sizes provide us with an approximation of the
attack’s success on different sized websites.
We ran 25 trials and ran the attacks on samples of 300, 500,
750 and 1000 users during each trial. For each sample size,
we report both the average precision/recall/reach across all
trials. We also report the precision/recall/reach of the trial
in which the adversary was most successful at identifying
users. From a privacy perspective, we care about the worst
case attack is as significant as the average case. it is impor-
tant to know the upper bound of the potential risk.
The neural network was trained on the sessions for 100 users
with 1 hidden layer and 100 neurons. Tables 4,6,8, and 10
contains the results of the worst case attack on the samples
of 300, 500, 750 and 1000 users respectively. The precision,
recall and reach values for each of the attacks correspond to
the values that maximized the F1 score. Table 5, 7, 9, 11,
correspond to the average of 300, 500, 750 and 1000 user
samples (respectively) across all 25 trials. The values in the
table are those that maximize the F1 score. In nearly every
sample, both the average and best case performance signif-
icantly exceeded the baseline. However, as the size of the
user sample grew, the performance of the attack appeared
to decline.
Figure 1: Recall vs precision curve for worst case
attack on 300 user sample
Figure 2: Recall vs precision curve for worst case
attack on 750 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.464806 0.911000 0.949000 45
Neural Net 0.237119 0.451000 0.500000 5
Baseline 0.008431 0.008532 0.713416 227
Table 4: Worst case attack on 300 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.274883 0.392010 0.920000 145
Neural Net 0.168720 0.424528 0.280000 42
Baseline 0.008431 0.008532 0.713416 227
Table 5: Average performances on 300 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.422236 0.787000 0.911000 74
Neural Net 0.438835 0.861000 0.895000 13
Baseline 0.015561 0.015906 0.717323 392
Table 6: Worst case attack on 500 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.326394 0.508936 0.910000 169
Neural Net 0.282179 0.413180 0.890000 136
Baseline 0.015561 0.015906 0.717323 392
Table 7: Average performance on 500 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.385857 0.676000 0.899000 105
Neural Net 0.342140 0.561000 0.877000 28
Baseline 0.012289 0.012442 1.000000 750
Table 8: Worst case attack on 750 user sample
Figure 3: Recall vs precision for homepage parti-
tioned sessions with minimum 35 pages per session
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.272032 0.440999 0.710000 199
Neural Net 0.201456 0.284529 0.690000 192
Baseline 0.012289 0.012442 1.000000 750
Table 9: Average performances on 750 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.336260 0.578000 0.804000 154
Neural Net 0.384924 0.946000 0.649000 5
Baseline 0.015088 0.015326 0.970913 955
Table 10: Worst case attack on 1000 user sample
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.260535 0.473010 0.580000 185
Neural Net 0.254350 0.417863 0.650000 211
Baseline 0.015088 0.015326 0.970913 955
Table 11: Average performance on 1000 user sample
5.3.3 Homepage partition
Conducting homepage partitioning with a minimum session
length of 35 pages resulted in 278 sessions from 100 users.
Because of the limited size of the data, we ran our attack
on the complete set (no sampling). Our neural network was
trained on 50 users and contained 1 hidden layer with 100
neurons. Figure 3 contains the PR curves for the different
attacks. The pairwise method achieves a peak F1 score when
precision is 0.098 and recall is 0.67 (reach is 3). The neural
network achieves a peak F1 score when precision is 0.276
and recall is 0.136 (reach is 5).
At lower recall values both attacks are successful at identi-
fying users. However, both perform significantly worse on
homepage partitioned sessions than on randomly partitioned
sessions.
6. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
We present a simple countermeasure in order to aid users in
protecting privacy and defending against semantic identifi-
cation attacks. For each session, we append p pages where
each page corresponds to a randomly selected category. In-
tuitively, these additional randomly distributed pages should
add noise to the session and lessen the skew of Du, making
it harder for the attack to successfully extract the browsing
fingerprint.
We experimented with p = {5, 10, 15} for a sample of 300
users and a session length of 35 pages. We ran 25 trials
for each value of p and we report the precision, recall, and
reach for the worst case attacks for each value of p. Tables
12,13,14 report the best curves out of 25 trials and the val-
ues of precision, recall, and reach which maximize the F1
score. Comparing these results to those in Table 1, we see
that the introduction of noisy pages somewhat decreases the
effectiveness of the attack and preserves privacy.
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.237559 0.316000 0.957000 239
Neural Net 0.418918 0.765000 0.926000 19
Table 12: Attack performance with 5 page additions
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.256262 0.389000 0.751000 84
Neural Net 0.486721 0.981000 0.966000 3
Table 13: Attack performance with 10 page addi-
tions
Attack F1 Precision Recall Reach
Pairwise 0.292982 0.494000 0.720000 98
Neural Net 0.413349 0.763000 0.902000 15
Table 14: Attack performance with 15 page addi-
tions
7. DISCUSSION
Despite the coarseness of the semantic signals - categorical
classifications for each page on a single website - our attack
strategies were able to successfully identify some propor-
tion of the sessions which were launched by the same user.
This work establishes a lower bound on the potential conse-
quences of any attack. A determined adversary could easily
gain access to richer semantic signals. For example, they
could use third party cookies to gather the pages visited by
a user across multiple sites [13]. Alternatively, a first party
website could log every action by a user on it is website and
use these to construct site specific browsing fingerprints. In
either case, the adversary would have access to a set of se-
mantic signals significantly richer than those present in our
data. In the best case for users, the adversary would merely
replicated our performance. In the worst case, they might
fare significantly better and identify more users.
Additionally, though our pairwise scoring function and clas-
sifier achieved success, both strategies were relatively simple
and straightforward. They demonstrated that the core prob-
lem of extracting and comparing browsing fingerprints could
be successfully tackled through either supervised learning or
pairwise scoring. More sophisticated techniques would likely
greatly enhance the threat posed by such an attack.
The poorer performance of the attacks on homepage parti-
tioned sessions can be explained by the nature of homepage
partitioning. While a visit to the homepage may occur if
a user is starting a new session, it may also occur if a user
was switching context within a single session. A user who
started browsing about sports and then wanted to read more
about news might return to the homepage to visit news arti-
cles. Partitioning on this homepage would then result in two
very different sessions with little in common. The browsing
fingerprints extracted for each would be unrepresentative of
the user.
Intuitively, it makes sense that the performance of an at-
tack would decrease as the sample of users increases in size.
At the granularity of data available, we expect a majority
of users to be relatively indistinguishable. As our sample
increases in size, the number of indistinguishable users will
grow disproportionately, resulting in the attack misclassi-
fying a greater number of session pairs. Interestingly, this
seems to suggest that if an adversary wanted to identify a
greater number of users, they should focus on smaller sam-
ples, ie. data from small websites.
Though in our work we focused exclusively on web brows-
ing, semantic identification attacks are applicable in a vastly
greater scope. They may be used by a first party to gather
usage analytics. The New York Times for example, may
run a semantic identification attack on each of its registered
accounts to see if multiple individuals are using the same ac-
count. For each session of browsing on a specific account, it
could extract browsing fingerprint. If multiple unique finger-
prints were extracted for a single account, it might deduce
that multiple individuals were using this account.
As expected, adding noise to the browsing sessions (i.e., spu-
rious pages visits) did reduce the effectiveness of the attack
- though only slightly. Simply adding noise to a browsing
session may not be sufficient to obscure the extracted fin-
gerprint (especially if that noise is added uniformly to all
sessions). Intuitively, we would likely need to obscure the
most distinguishing parts of a session. This may require
copying page visits from other sessions (not launched by the
original user) in order to confuse an adversary.
In summary, the results of our experiments demonstrate that
an adversary employing our attacks could successfully ex-
tract browsing fingerprints from a subset of sessions and
use those fingerprints to identify when two sessions were
launched by the same user. We presented a framework for
evaluating the success of these attacks in the context of
an adversary’s goals and demonstrate how different attacks
could be advantageous to different adversaries.
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